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CASSIRER V. THYSSEN-BORNEMISZA
COLLECTION FOUNDATION
862 F.3d 951 (9th Cir. 2017)
Alyssa Pullara*
I. INTRODUCTION
This case concerns a painting by French Impressionist
artist, Camille Pissarro, titled, Rue Saint-Honord, apris midi, effet
de plui, which was expropriated by the Nazi government in 1939
through a forced sale from its owner, Lilly Cassirer Neubauer.I
The painting entered into the art market and after several
transactions in the United States and abroad, it ended up in the
hands of Baron Hans-Heinrich Thyssen-Bornemisza. 2 After many
years in his personal collection, the Baron later sold it to the
Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Foundation ("TBC" or the
"Foundation") in Spain.3 Except for instances when the painting
was on loan to other public institutions, the painting has been on
display in the Thyssen-Bomemisza Museum in Madrid since
1992.4
After two visits to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in
2010 and 2013, the District Court was tasked with determining
whether the Defendant had acquired title to the painting under
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I Cassirerv. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Foundation, 862 F.3d 951, 955 (9th
Cir. 2017).
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id. at 956-57.
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Spanish law governing adverse possession.5 In this third appeal,
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court's application of
Spanish law but remanded for reconsideration of whether Spain's
law of adverse possession had been properly applied." 6

II. BACKGROUND
A. FactualHistory
Claude Cassirer brought an action against the Kingdom of
Spain ("Spain") and the Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection
Foundation to recover a Camille Pissarro painting titled, Rue
Saint-Honord, apris midi, effet de plui (the "Painting"). 7
Sold by the artist in 1898 to a successful German-Jewish
businessman, Julius Cassirer, the Painting remained with the
Cassirer family in Germany for over four decades. 8 In 1939,
during a time of mass expropriation of property held by German
Jews, Lilly Neubauer ("Lilly"), Claude Cassirer's greatgrandmother, was forced to sell the Painting to Jackob
Scheidwimmer ("Scheidwimmer"), a renowned Berlin art dealer.9
Scheidwimmer had been appointed as an art appraiser by the Nazi
government and was assigned to appraise the Pissarro painting.' 0
After inspecting the painting, Scheidwimmer refused to allow Lilly
to leave the country with the painting and demanded she sell the
painting for $360 in Reichsmarks. 1 Fearing she would not be

'

Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Foundation, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

76590 (C.D. Cal. June 12, 2015).

6 Cassirer, 862 F.3d at 955.
Cassirer v. Spain, 461 F. Supp. 2d 1157, 1161 (C.D. Cal. 2006).
Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain, 616 F.3d 1019, 1023 (9th Cir. 2010).
Cassirer,461 F.Supp. 2d at 1162.
10 Id.
" Id.; In 1939, $360 German Reichsmarks was the equivalent of $896 United States
Dollars. Adjusted with inflation, $896 U.S. dollars would equal $15,870 U.S.
Dollars in 2018. The Rue Saint-Honord, apris midi, effet de plui Painting has been
recently estimated to be worth over $40 million dollars. Isaac Kaplan, Appeals
Court Revives 16-Year Lawsuit over $40 Million Nazi-Looted Pissarro,
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allowed to leave the country if she refused the sale, she succumbed
to Scheidwimmer's demand.12
Soon after its sale, the Gestapo confiscated the Painting.13
For years it changed through several hand all over the world until
1976 when Baron Thyssen-Bornemisza purchased the Painting for
$275,000 from a New York Gallery. 14 As a famous industrialist
and avid art collector, the Baron kept the Painting in Switzerland
as part of his collection, except when it was on public display in
exhibitions outside of Switzerland.' 5
In 1988, Baron Thyssen-Bornemisza leased his extensive
collection to the Kingdom of Spain for a period of ten years, but
halfway into the lease, the Spanish state purchased the entire
collection comprising of 775 paintings for $350 million.1 6 After
being purchased, the painting found its home in the collections of
the Thyssen-Bornemisza Museum, an instrumentality of Spain, in
Madrid.1 7 The Painting has been on display in Madrid since 1993,
except for brief periods when it was on loan to other public
institutions.' 8
In 2000, Claude Cassirer, Lily's grandson, discovered the
location of the Painting in Madrid and petitioned the Spanish

https://www.artsy.net/article/artsy-editorial-lawsuit-40-million-nazi-looted-pissarropainting-revived (last visited Mar. 8, 2018).
12 Cassirerv. Spain, 616 F.3d 1019, 1023 (9th Cir. 2010).
13

Id

14 Cassirer, 862 F.3d at 956; In 1943, the Painting was sold to an unknown
consignor at the Lange Auction in Berlin to an unknown purchaser for 95,000
Reichsmarks. In 1951, the Frank Perls Gallery of Beverly Hills arranged to move
the Painting out of Germany and into California to sell to collector Sidney Brody for
$14,850. In 1952, Sydney Schoenberg, a St. Louis art collector, purchased the
Painting for $16,500. In 1976, the Baron purchased the Painting through the Stephen
Hahn Gallery in New York.
15 Id. at 956-57.
16
Cassirer,461 F. Supp. 2d at 1161.
17 Id.
' Cassirer, 862 F.3d at 955.
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government to have the Painting returned, which was ultimately
rejected. 19
B. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976("FSIA")2 0
establishes the limitations as to whether a foreign sovereign nation
(or its political subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities) may be
sued in U.S. courts. 2 1 The federal jurisdictional statute indicates
that a foreign defendant (qualified as a 'Foreign State" under the
Act) shall be immune to suit in any U.S. court, unless a statutory
exception to immunity applies.2 2 The Cassirer's argued that the
Foundation was subject to suit in the U.S. under the Expropriations
Exception. 2 3 To establish subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to
the Expropriation Exception, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1)
rights in property are at issue; (2) the property was "taken"; (3) the
taking was in violation of international law; and either (4)(a) the
property... is present in the United States in connection with a
commercial activity carried on in the United States by that foreign
state"; or (4)(b) the property... is owned by an agency or
instrumentality of the foreign state and that agency or
instrumentality is engaged in a commercial activity in the United
States.2 4
In their 2010 en banc opinion, the Ninth Circuit determined
that Cassirer had set forth compelling evidence to show that Spain
and the Foundation were subject to suit under the expropriations
'9
20
21

Cassirer,616 F.3d at 1023.
28 U.S.C. § 1605 (2016).
Cassirer,616 F.3d at 1026.

22

d.

23

Id.

24 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3). "Taken" refers to acts of a sovereign, not a private
enterprise, that deprive a plaintiff of property without adequate compensation.
Abelesez v. Magyar Nemzet Bank, 692 F.3d 661, 673 (7th Cir. 2012). "Taking in
Violation of International Law" refers to "the nationalization or expropriation of
property without payment of the prompt and effective compensation required by
international law." Zappia Middle E. Consts. Co. v. Emirate of Abu Dhabi, 215 F.3d
247, 251 (2d Cir. 2000). The Foundation is an instrumentality of Spain. Cassirer,
616 F.3d at 1027. The author has broken the Act down for to simplify analysis.
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exception. 2 5 The Foundation countered that the takings exception
only applies to the foreign state that expropriated the property and
not to the later purchaser who was not complicit in the taking. 2 6
However, the panel held that § 1605(a)(3) does not require Spain
to be the entity that expropriated the painting in violation of
international law, and that the Foundation engaged in sufficient
commercial activity in the United States to satisfy the FSIA. 2 7
C. HolocaustExpropriatedArt Recovery Act of 2016
The thousands of artworks and other property
misappropriated by the Nazis during World War II is considered to
be the "greatest displacement of art in human history." 28 Victims
of Nazi persecution have attempted to take legal action in the
United States to recover their stolen property but are faced with
procedural obstacles due to State statute of limitation
requirements. 29 As a result, claims are typically barred from either
the date of loss or the date the claim should have been
discovered.3 0
In an attempt to alleviate the burden for those seeking
recovery, Congress passed the Holocaust Expropriated Art
Recovery Act ("HEAR Act"). 3 1 The federal statute preempts "any
other provision of Federal or State law or any defense at law
relating to the passage of time." 32 It also allows a claim "to

25

Cassirer,616 F.3d t 1027-28.

26

I

27

Id. at 1028; The Cassirer's argued that the Foundation had engaged in commercial

activity through: "borrowing art works from American museums; encouraging
United States residents to visit the museum and accepting entrance fees from them;
selling various items to United States citizens including images of the Painting; and
maintaining a web site where United States citizens may buy admission tickets using
United States credit cards and view the paintings on display, including Rue SaintHonord, apris midi, effet de plui. Nicholas M. O'Donnell, A Tragic Fate: Law and
Ethics in the Battle Over Nazi-looted Art, 243 (2017).
28 HolocaustExpropriatedArtRecovery Act, 22 U.S.C. §1621 (2016).
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id.

32 22 U.S.C. §1621 (5)(a).
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recover any artwork or other property that was lost during the
covered period because of Nazi persecution" to go forward if
commenced within six years after actual discovery (defined as
"knowledge") of the identity and location of the property and the
claimant has a possessory interest in the artwork or other
property. 3 3 Thus, the Ninth Circuit applied the HEAR Act to
supply the statute of limitations and to preempt California's statute
of limitations. 3 4
D. ProceduralHistory
In 2005, the Cassirer's brought suit in a California district
court.35 Since then, the case has been tied up in complex issues
ranging from jurisdiction to the statute of limitations. 36 In 2015,
the case moved on to the issue of choice of law. 3 7 The Foundation
moved for summary judgment on the ground that under Spanish
law, the Foundation has good title to the painting. 3 8
The District Court applied the federal common law
approach traditionally used by the Ninth Circuit to decide the
conflicts of law issue. 3 9 The federal common law approach is
based on which place "has the most significant relationship to the
thing and the parties...." 40 The presiding judge ruled that Spain
had the greatest interest in determining ownership of the Painting
and that Spanish substantive law should therefore apply.41

33 Id. at § 4(2) The statute applies to a wide category of types of cultural property,
including pictures, paintings, drawings, prints, lithographs, engravings, books,
archives, musical objects and manuscripts and sacred and ceremonial objects; § 4(3),
22 U.S.C. § 1621 (2016) (The term "covered period" refers to the period between
January 1, 1933, and December 31, 1954).
34 Cassirer, 862 F.3d at 960.
35
Id. at 957.
36 Id.
37
d
38

Id. at 958.
Id. at 961.
40 Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 222 (Am. Law Inst. 1971).
41 Cassirer, 862 F.3d at 963 (The court justified its conclusion by relying on the
location of the Painting in Spain for more than twenty years, and the relatively weak
relationship between the Painting and California).
39

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol28/iss2/5
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Under Spanish Law of adverse possession (also termed
usucapio or acquisitive prescription), a possessor can gain title to
movable property if the possessor possessed the property (1) for
the statutory period; (2) as owner, and (3) "publicly, peacefully
and without interruption." 4 2 The required statutory period is three
years if the possessor acts in good faith and in six years if in bad
faith.43
The District Court determined that the second element was
met because the Foundation outwardly acknowledged ownership
of the painting since its acquisition in 1993 and the Foundation's
display and publication of its possession of the Painting was
considered public, peaceful and uninterrupted.4 However, to
counter the summary judgement motion, the Cassirer's argued that
Article 1955 of the Spanish Civil Code was inapplicable, because
Article 1956 barred the acquisition of ownership by acquisitive
prescription in the event that: (1) the Painting was misappropriated
by theft or robbery; (2) the possessor was a principal, accomplice
or accessory to the crime committed; and (3) the statute of
limitations for that crime must not have expired.4 5
While it was undisputed that the Foundation was neither
the principal nor the accomplice of the crime in question, the Court
examined whether the Foundation could be seen as an accessory
(encubridor) to the Nazi's crime. 4 6 After analyzing the Spanish
Civil Code and related Spanish case law, the District Court
concluded the Foundation was not an accessory because it did not
possess the intent or purpose to prevent the crime from being
discovered. 47 Thus, as a matter of Spanish law, the Foundation
acquired ownership of the painting. 4 8
42

Spain Civil Code 220 (2009) (English Translation).

43 Id.; See, Spain Civil Code 220 (2009) (English Translation).
44 Cassirer, 862 F.3d at 265.
45 Id.
46

(citing Spain Civil Code 220)

Id. at 966.
47 Cassirer, 862 F.3d at 267.
48 Id. (concluding that the Foundation had acquired ownership of the Painting on

June 21, 1999, six years after it had purchased the Painting from Baron HansHeinrich Thyssen-Bomesmisza).
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III. ANALYSIS
A. Statute of Limitations

While the current appeal was pending, Congress passed the
Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act in December of 2016.49
In light of this new legislation, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the
issue of whether California, as the forum state, supplied the statute
of limitations for the Cassirer's claims and concluded that the
Cassirer's had filed their claims timely under the HEAR Act.so
However, the court ultimately held that the District Court
had incorrectly granted the Foundation's motion for summary
judgment based on its erroneous application of Spain's acquisitive
prescription law.51
B. Application of Spanish Law
As a preliminary step, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the
District Court that Spanish Law applied based on the direction of
the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. 52 Section 222 of
the Second Restatement advances a "most significant relationship"
test. 5 3 Meaning courts should consider which state "has the most
significant relationship to the thing and the parties."54

49

Id. at 959-602.

So Id. at 960 (Cassirers acquired actual knowledge of the Painting's location in 2000

when Claude Cassirer learned from a client that the Painting was in the Museum.
After the Cassirer Family's 2001 petition in Spain was denied, the family filed this
action in 2005. Since the suit was filed within six years of actual discovery, the
claims are timely under the HEAR Act.)
51
Id. at 965.
52 Id. at 961 (citing Schoenberg v. Exportadorade Dal. S.A. de C V., 930 F.2d 777,
782 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that "when jurisdiction is based on the FSIA, 'federal
common law applies to the choice of law rule determination. Federal common law
follows the approach of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws").
53 Cassirer, 862 F.3d at 962.
54 Id. (citing Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 222 (Am. Law Inst. 1971))
(emphasis added).
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Additionally, the Second Restatement has a specialized
rule for claims of acquisition by adverse prescription of an interest
in chattel (also referred to as the situs rule)." Section 246
provides:
The state where a chattel is situated has the
dominant interest in determining the circumstances
under which an interest in the chattel will be
or
by
transferred by adverse possession
prescription. The local law of this state is applied to
determine whether there has been such a transfer
and the nature of the interest transferred.5 6
In considering both sections, the Court recognized that
Spain has a significant interest in having its substantive law
applied to determine whether the Painting was transferred to TBC
via acquisitive prescription because the Painting was bought and
remains in Spain. 5 7
However, after analyzing the District Court's application of
Spanish law, the Ninth Circuit concluded that it had erred in
deciding that TBC had acquired title to the Painting pursuant to
Article 1955.58 The Ninth Circuit found a triable issue of fact as
whether TBC is an encubridor (an "accessory") within the
meaning of Article 1956.59
C. Defining "encubridor"under Spanish Law
If it were to be read alone, Article 1955 would support the
District Court's finding that Spanish law vested title in TBC after
fulfilling the six-year possession requirement. 6 0 However, the
Ninth Circuit found that "the very next article in the Spanish Civil
5

Cassirer,862 F.3d at 963.

56 Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws

§ 246, cmt. a. (Am. Law Inst. 1971)

(emphasis added).
" Cassirer, 862 F.3d at 964.
58
Id. at 965.
59
Id.
at 966.
6
1d. at 965.

Published by Via Sapientiae, 2018

9

DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 28, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 5

174

DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & IPLAW [Vol. XXVIII:165

Code, Article
operates." 6 1

1956,

modifies

how

acquisitive

prescription

Article 1956 extends the time of possession required for
acquisitive prescription only as to those chattels (1) robbed or
stolen from the rightful owner and (2) to the principals,
accomplices or accessories after the fact with actual knowledge. 6 2
Therefore, as to any principals, accomplices, or accessories
(encubridors)to a robbery or theft, Article 1956 extends the period
of possession necessary to vest title. 6 3 In effect, taking the period
of possession necessary under Article 1955 (six years), adding,
first, the criminal statute of limitation prescribed in Spain's Penal
Code (five years), and second, the civil statute of limitation also
prescribed in Spain's Penal Code (fifteen years).6 4 Thus, if the
Cassirer's could show that the Foundation was an encubridor
under Article 1956, the period of possession required to vest title
would be a total of twenty-six years, instead of six years. 6 5
Consequently, the Cassirer's would not gain lawful title until the
year 2019.66
The Ninth Circuit considered the lower court's assessment
of the term encubridor, and observed that the District Court simply
followed the Foundation's argument that the term should be
defined following the reference in the Spanish Penal Code of 1973,
which was in force at the time the Foundation acquired the
Painting. 67 Therefore, defining encubridor to include "only
persons who, after the commission of the underlying crime, acted
in some manner to aid those who committed the crime to avoid
penalties or prosecutions." 6 8

61

Id.

62
63
64
65

Id. at 966.
Cassirer, 862 F.3d. at 966.
Id.

66

Id.

67
68

Id.

Id.
Cassirer, 862 F.3d at 967

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol28/iss2/5
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The Court, however, felt compelled to assess the Cassirer's
claim that the term should be defined following the reference in
the 1870 Penal Code, since that was the definition of encubridor
the Spanish Legislature had in mind when Article 1956 was
enacted. 69 After applying the Spanish rules of statutory
interpretation and looking to the historical and legislative
background of the term "encubridor," the Court agreed with the
Cassirers that the term should be construed consistently with the
definition found in the 1870 Penal Code. 70 Therefore defining
encubridor as "one who knowingly benefits himself from stolen
property."

71

This, in effect, widened the definition of encubridor and
opened the door for the Court to find the Foundation capable of
being an accessory of the crime simply because it knowingly
benefited from the stolen property (the Painting).7 2 Assuming now
that Article 1956 applies to someone who knowingly benefits from
stolen property, the Foundation had not established, as a matter of
law, that it acquired title to the Painting through acquisitive
prescription.73 Since it is undisputed that the Foundation benefited
from having the Painting in the Museum, the Court reviewed the
evidence pertaining to the actual knowledge requirement of Article
1956.74 The Court concluded their discussion by stating that the
Cassirers had adduced enough evidence to create a genuine issue
of material fact whether the Foundation knew the Painting had
been stolen when they acquired it from Baron Hans-Heinrich
Thyssen-Bomemisza. 7 5
With the triable issue of material fact present, the Ninth
Circuit concluded that the District Court's interpretation of

69 See generally Cassirer,862 F.3d.
70 Id. at 971.
71
d. at 972.
72 Id.

73 Id. at 968-73.
74 Id.

7 Cassirer, 862 F.3d at 972.
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encubridorwas too narrow and needed to be revisited in the lower
court once again.76
D. Lawful Title Under Swiss Law
The Ninth Circuit also addressed the Foundation's
argument that they were the lawful owner of the Painting because
the Foundation purchased the Painting in a lawful conveyance
from the Baron, who had valid title to convey. 77 The Court once
again followed the Second Restatement and looked to Spanish law
to determine whether there was a lawful conveyance. 78 Since
Spain would apply the law of.situs for moveable property, Spanish
courts would look to New York Law to determine the status of the
Baron's 1976 purchase of the Painting and Switzerland's
"acquisitive prescription" law to determine whether the Baron
acquired valid title while possessing the Painting between 1976
and 1993.79
The Foundation's claim to valid title from the 1976
purchase fails because under New York law, "a thief cannot pass
good title."80 Therefore, regardless of the knowledge of subsequent
buyers, all artwork stolen during World War II would never be
possessed with valid title. 8 ' As for Swiss law, a purchaser could
acquire title to movable property through acquisitive prescription
if possessed in good faith for a five year period. 82 While the Baron
completed the five-year period of possession between 1976-1981,
his ability to gain title rests solely in whether he acted in good
faith. 83 After reviewing the record, however, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that there was a triable issue of fact as to the Baron's
good faith due to several "red flags" including: the questionable
76 Id. at 981.
n Id. at 974.
78Id.

79 Id.; See supra note 11.
80
Id.
8' Cassirer, 862 F.3d at 974-75.
82 Id. at 975.
83 Id. (a good faith purchaser is one who is honestly and reasonably convinced that
the seller is entitled to transfer ownership).

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol28/iss2/5
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past of the Stephen Hahn Gallery, the extremely low purchase
price of the Painting, and the minimal amount of provenance
information given by the Gallery. 8 4
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court's
grant of summary judgment on the basis that, as a matter of law,
the Baron acquired title to the Painting under Swiss Law. 85

IV. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS
The Cassirer decision is one of many Nazi-looted art
restitution cases plagued with complicated procedural and
substantive constraints. However, this decision added several new
elements to the way courts analyze and contextualize art restitution
cases and could have significant implications for future cases.
This case is notable for being the first circuit court to apply
the Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act after being passed in
2016.86 In addition to the court's holding that the statute of
limitations begins to run upon actual discovery, not constructive
discovery, the court also concluded that it can be applied
retroactively to claims filed prior to its passage. 8 7 However, the
important takeaway in the decision is that the Ninth Circuit made
clear the HEAR Act does not alter the substantive choice-of-law
analysis.8 8
Furthermore, this decision is primarily significant due to
the choice of law issue. Since its enactment in 1976, the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act has opened the door to thousands of

84 Id. at 975-76. The Stephen Hahn Gallery has a documented history of dealing in

Nazi-looted Art. See Blair Clarkson, Judge Oks Pursuit of Stolen Art, The Daily
Journal, January 21, 2005, http://www.bsIaw.net/news/050121.html.
85 Cassirer,862 F.3d at 976.
86 Clarkson, supranote 84.
87 Id. at 954-60.
88 Id. at 964.
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suits against foreign states in American courts. 89 Where a foreign
sovereign is not immune, FSIA indicates that the defendant
sovereign should be "held liable in the same manner and to the
same extent as private individuals under like circumstances." 9 0
However, when it comes to which choice of law rules to apply in
FSIA claims, neither Congress or the Supreme Court have
addressed the issue. 9 1 Consequently, a U.S. court may end up
applying either state, federal, or foreign substantive law depending
on the court's choice of law analysis. 92 Accordingly, there appears
to be an inconsistent standard for choosing choice of law rules
between the federal circuits. 93
Both the Ninth Circuit and Second Circuit resolve conflicts
of law under FSIA differently. 94 Because Section 1606 of FSIA
specifies that a defendant sovereign be "held liable in the same
manner and to the same extent as private individuals under like
circumstances," the Second Circuit determined that Congress
intended for a universal choice of law standard for FSIA cases. 95
Therefore, the Second Circuit believes in order to achieve
Congress's "goal of applying identical substantial laws to foreign
states and private individuals," a federal court must use choice of
law rules from the state in which it sits to ensure that the court
conducts "the same choice of law analysis in FSIA cases as it
would apply if all the parties to action were private." 9 6
Conversely, as we have seen in the Cassirerdecision, the
Ninth Circuit chooses a "modem" approach to choice of law issues
89 Hannelore Sklar, Choice of Law Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act:
Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Foundation and the Unresolved
DisagreementAmong the Circuits, 47 GEO. J. INT'L. L. 1198 (2016).
90
Id. at 1200.
91 Id.
92

Id. at 1200-01.
Id. at 1201.
94
Id. at 1208.
95 Sklar, supra note 89 (citing Barkanic v. Gen. Admin. of Civil Aviation of the
People'sRepublic of China, 923 F.2d 957, 959 (2d Cir. 1991) (stating that "FSIA
implicitly requires courts to apply the choice of law provisions of the forum state
with
the respect to all issues governed by state substantive law").
9
93

6 Id.
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by basing its decision on the examination of the different states'
interests in having their own laws applied. 97 Because the FSIA
does not contain explicit guidance on choice of law, the Ninth
Circuit preferred to resort to federal common law for a choice-oflaw rule. 98 In support of its decision, the court highlights the
distinction between FSIA jurisdiction and a federal court's
diversity jurisdiction. Pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in
Erie v. Tompkins, "the use of federal common law in specialized
areas where jurisdiction is not based on diversity" is permitted. 99
In applying the federal common law, the court therefore looked to
the Second Restatement's "most significant relationship" test. 00
While both the Circuit's approaches to choice of law under
FSIA are valid, the inconsistent approach fails to achieve
Congress's objective while also accounting for the international
complications FSIA produces.'o' Therefore, this issue is one that
would benefit from a Supreme Court judgment delineating a
universal approach.
evoke
such
international
FSIA
cases
Because
considerations, a universal application of federal choice of law
rules would remedy any confusion between the federal circuits.
Furthermore, the consistent application of federal common law
rules would better address political sensitivity concerns and
facilitate the creation of a more "uniform jurisprudence."1 02 The
inconsistencies between courts has the ability to undercut any
remedies for violations of international law that the FSIA seeks to
provide. Likewise, using the Ninth Circuit approach would
conserve judicial resources, saving courts like the one in Cassirer
from conducting two choice of law analyses. Lastly, with this
uniform choice of law standard in all U.S. courts, foreign
defendants will be able to better anticipate what choice of law
97 Cassirer, 862 F.3d at 964.
98

Id. at 961.
99 Sklar, supra note 67 at 1210 (citing Cassirerv. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection

Found., 862 F.3d 951, 976 (9th Cir. 2017)).
100
Id. at 1211.
101
See generally, Sklar, supra note 67.
102
Id. at 1215 (citing H.R. Rep No. 94-1487, at 32 (1976)).
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rules apply to their case and could help curb the possibility of
venue shopping.

V. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit's decision is yet another illustration of
the complexity of litigation surrounding FSIA and the Nazi-looted
art restitution field.1 0 3 As the most recent FSIA decision to come
out a federal circuit, Cassirer illustrates the divergent methods in
selecting choice of law rules under FSIA cases. 1 0 4
In order to achieve the drafter's intent of holding a foreign
state liable in the same manner as a private individual, the Second
Circuit chooses to apply the choice of law rules of the forum
state.1 05 Therefore, maintaining that FSIA implicitly requires
courts to analyze these cases similarly to cases brought under
federal diversity jurisdiction.1 0 6 However, due to the federal
implications, the Ninth Circuits rejects that notion and looks to
federal common law rules when deciding FSIA cases. 0 7
As a legal discipline, conflict of law stresses the
"importance of predictability, certainty, and uniformity of
results."i0 8 While Congress did not provide guidance for deciding
conflict of law issues in FSIA cases, federal circuits should work
toward creating a universal approach with these values in mind.
Since FSIA cases implicate federal concerns like international law,
the collective application of the Ninth Circuit approach would
carefully balance these concerns and Congressional objectives,
while simultaneously cutting out any uncertainty for future courts
in deciding FSIA cases.

103 See generally, Sklar, supra note 67.
104 See generally Cassirer, 862 F.3d
957.
105

1d.
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107
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Cassirer, 862 F.3d at 961.
Sklar, supra note 67 at 1219.
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